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PUBLICATIONS THAT INCITE, SOLICIT, OR
INSTRUCT: PUBLISHER RESPONSIBILITY
OR CAVEAT EMPTOR?
Terri I. Day*
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . ... ",
"llt is never possible to give complete expression to ideas in
practice. It is the nature of things that action should come
less near the truth than words."2
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional guarantee of free speech and expres-
sion is not absolute. The United States Supreme Court has
carved out certain categories of speech that fall outside the
protection of the First Amendment.3 However, when chal-
lenged speech does not fit easily within one of these catego-
ries, courts have been reluctant to impose limits for fear of
chilling the free exchange of ideas and the free access to
information.
In cases involving publications which contain violent de-
pictions or publications that invite the reader's reliance,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Orlando School of Law; LL.M.
1995, Yale University; J.D. 1991, University of Florida; M.S.S.A. 1976, Case
Western Reserve University; B.A. 1974, University of Wisconsin, Madison. Pro-
fessor Day teaches torts. A former psychiatric social worker and television pro-
ducer, Professor Day's article is inspired by an interest in the relationship be-
tween the influence of media and publications on human behavior, tort
principles of causation and foreseeability, and First Amendment freedoms.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. DAVID SELBOURNE, THE PRINCIPLE OF DuTY 12 (1994) (quoting PLATo,
THE REPUBLIC).
3. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tivity); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); see also, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978) (affording commercial speech limited protection commensu-
rate with its subordinate position on the scale of First Amendment values).
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either in the form of advertisements or "how to" instructions,
courts generally afford protection to the publication and its
publisher under the ambit of the First Amendment. This ar-
ticle will examine some of these cases and the novel theories
upon which plaintiffs attempt to create liability and recover
damages.
The plaintiffs in the cases discussed have been physically
injured after relying on the information in "how to" books,
have become victims of "gun for hire" advertisements, or have
exhibited particular sensitivity to violence portrayed in mov-
ies and rock music. While the cases are factually distinct, the
theories upon which plaintiffs urge recovery, and the courts'
uniform rejection of such theories, are the common thread
running throughout these cases.
Tort principles and First Amendment jurisprudence con-
flict in these cases. The First Amendment protection of the
freedom of speech and of the press is "not based on the naive
belief that speech can do no harm but on the confidence that
the benefits society reaps from the free flow and exchange of
ideas outweigh the costs society endures by receiving repre-
hensible or dangerous ideas."4 Therefore, a bedrock of First
Amendment principles is that the state may not punish pro-
tected speech, directly or indirectly, whether by criminal pen-
alty5 or civil liability.6
Tort principles depend upon a recognized duty owed to
the plaintiff by the defendant. While the general rule is that
"all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent
others from being injured as the result of their conduct,"7
whether the law will recognize a duty to a particular plaintiff
depends on several factors. Those factors considered in deter-
mining whether the imposition of a duty is justified in a par-
ticular circumstance include the following: a balancing of the
societal interests involved, including but not limited to, the
guidance of history, the convenience of the rule, judgment as
4. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
6. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ("What a State
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.").
7. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 1975).
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to where the loss should fall, and concepts of morality and
justice; the severity of the risk; the burden upon the defend-
ant; the foreseeability of harm; the likelihood of occurrence;
and the relationship between the parties."
In the publisher liability context, it is common practice
for publishers to publish and distribute a third-party author's
work. Consequently, courts have been reluctant to impose a
guarantor's duty on publishers. According to many courts, to
impose such a duty would severely burden publishers by re-
quiring them to "scrutiniz[e] and even [test] all procedures
contained in any of their publications."9 One consideration
in tort law is the allocation of the risks and the distribution of
the costs between publishers and the consuming public. 10
Many courts have echoed a New Jersey court's belief that to
place the risks and costs for injuries occasioned by a publica-
tion on the publisher "would have a staggering adverse effect
on the commercial world and our economic system."1'
Most courts faced with a negligence claim against a pub-
lisher for injuries allegedly caused by its publication have
concluded that the First Amendment bars such a claim.' 2
However, the First Amendment does not preclude publisher
liability based upon negligence. 13 In refusing to consider a
publisher's culpability in some of these cases, courts may be
giving greater protection to speech than is necessary to en-
8. Id. (citing William L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15
(1953)).
9. Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (111. App. Ct.
1985); see also, Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1974).
10. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 4, at 24 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing ability to bear or distribute loss as a
factor affecting tort liability).
11. Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
12. This paper refers to nonlibel negligence claims unless expressly stated.
13. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (recognizing
that state libel law may impose liability so long as it is not liability without
fault); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balanc-
ing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 967-68 (1987) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
146-47 (1983), for the proposition that speech pertaining to private matters is
deemed to be of lesser constitutional value); Brett L. Myers, Read at Your Own
Risk: Publisher Liability for Defective How-To Books, 45 ARK. L. REV. 699,
(1992) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), for the proposi-
tion that the First Amendment does not preclude publisher liability based upon
negligence).
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sure protection of First Amendment principles. While the
publications at issue enjoy First Amendment protection,
these cases do not involve matters of public concern in the
sense of core First Amendment speech. 14 Also, the state has
an important interest in safeguarding persons from physical
harm. To deny recovery in these cases lessens publishers'in-
centive to remove from the marketplace material that is dan-
gerous and leads unwitting users to injure themselves, their
property, or others.
This article concludes that a more reasoned approach to
these cases is to apply a balancing test in which the state in-
terest sought to be protected by imposing tort liability is bal-
anced against the level of First Amendment interest embod-
ied in the challenged communication. Although the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence favors broad rules of
general application, 15 the Court has implicitly recognized the
need to apply a balancing test when faced with a novel
issue. 16
II. BROADCASTER'S LIABanrY FOR FORESEEABLE HARM
Foreseeability of risk prompted the California Supreme
Court in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. to hold a radio broad-
caster liable for the content of its broadcast which caused in-
jury to a third party.17 Family members of a deceased motor
accident victim brought a wrongful death action against the
radio station." The radio station had conducted a contest
14. The First Amendment recognizes "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citations omitted).
15. The Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
feared that a balancing test between competing values on a case-by-case basis
would "lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and.., render
[its] duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-
44.
16. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 944 (discussing the frequency
and commonplace use of "balancing" as a method of constitutional interpreta-
tion in First Amendment cases and others); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Com-
munity and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE
L.J. 1, 2, 12-13 (1987) (discussing the model of the judicial "balance" which ap-
peared in Justice Powell's opinions on free speech).
17. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
18. Id. at 37.
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that awarded a prize to the first contestant who located a rov-
ing disc jockey who was broadcasting live from various loca-
tions. 19 While racing to the next location, two teens listening
to the broadcast collided with another motorist, killing the
plaintiffs' husband and father.2 °
The Weirum court upheld the plaintiffs' recovery from
the radio broadcaster on a theory of negligence. 21 Recogniz-
ing that "foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration
in establishing the element of duty,"2 2 the court found that
the radio broadcaster owed a duty to the deceased.23 It was
immaterial that the particular type of accident had not hap-
pened before24 or that the accident was caused by the reck-
less conduct of the youthful contestants.25
The First Amendment was hardly mentioned by the
Weirum court:
Defendant's contention that the giveaway contest must
be afforded the deference due society's interest in the
First Amendment is clearly without merit. The issue here
is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of a
broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to dece-
dent. The First Amendment does not sanction the inflic-
tion of physical injury merely because achieved by word,
rather than act.26
In subsequent cases, plaintiffs have attempted to argue
that their particular case is similar to Weirum in order to per-
suade the courts that negligence actions against broadcasters
and publishers are not barred by the First Amendment.
Courts, on the other hand, have characterized Weirum as a
"true" incitement case, 27 notwithstanding the fact that the
19. Id. The radio station had a large teenage audience. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 40, 42.
22. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 1975).
23. Id. at 41.
24. Id. at 40 ("[Tlhe fortuitous absence of prior injury does not justify reliev-
ing defendant from responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its acts.").
25. Id. ("Here, reckless conduct by youthful contestants, stimulated by de-
fendant's broadcast, constituted the hazard to which decedent was exposed.").
26. Id.
27. The distinguishing characteristics between Weirum and the cases be-
low, according to the courts addressing this issue, are the live broadcast which
urged listeners to act in an inherently dangerous manner and the likely foresee-
ability that listeners would act in an inherently dangerous manner. These two
characteristics - the advocacy to act in an inherently dangerous manner and
the great likelihood that the listeners would act in an inherently dangerous
1995]
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Weirum court never mentioned an incitement theory. In its
decision, the Georgia Supreme Court noted, "In our opinion,
Weirum... constitute[s] authority for the proposition that a
tort defendant can be held liable if the defendant incited,
within the meaning of Brandenburg, a third party to commit
a crime against the plaintiff."2 8
III. PUBLISHER'S LIABILITY UNDER AN INCITEMENT THEORY
Speech that advocates violence or lawlessness under the
Brandenburg v. Ohio test falls outside the protection of the
First Amendment. 29 Early Supreme Court cases addressed
the tension between the First Amendment protection of
speech and statutes that criminalized "fighting words"30 or
advocacy which creates a "clear and imminent" danger of law-
lessness.31 Today, the test for incitement recognizes a dis-
manner - satisfy the Brandenburg incitement test. See infra note 29 and ac-
companying text. Cf. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that publisher of rock music did not incite listener to commit suicide);
Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981) (af-
firming judgment for nonsuit where plaintiff was artificially raped by assailants
who recreated a scene from a NBC movie Born Innocent), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1108 (1982); Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981)
(holding suit barred by First Amendment where plaintiff became blind after
attempting to reproduce a sound effect demonstrated on a television show);
DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (affirming
summary judgment for defendants where teen hung himself after viewing
hanging stunt on Johnny Carson show). All these cases distinguished Weirum
on the grounds that the broadcast in Weirum was live and that it actively and
repeatedly encouraged listeners to speed to the announced locations. These
other cases did not involve "a 'real time' urging of listeners to act in a particular
manner. There was no dynamic interaction with, or live importuning of, partic-
ular listeners." McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 196 (Ct. App. 1988).
28. Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582 n.2 (Ga. 1981).
29. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg created a two
part test: advocacy for violence or lawlessness must be directed to incite or pro-
duce imminent lawless action and such advocacy must be likely to incite or
produce such action. Merely advocating violence is not enough to meet the in-
citement test. Id. at 447.
30. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
31. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding California's crim-
inal syndicalism statute), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969). In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis articulated the test for incite-
ment as speech which advocates a "dear and imminent danger of some substan-
tive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent." Id. at 373 (echo-
ing the "clear and present danger" test articulated in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). In Schenck, which addressed a violation under the Es-
pionage Act, Justice Holmes articulated the "classic" example of unprotected
speech: "falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Like Whitney, Schenck has been super-
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tinction between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent
lawless action.
Plaintiffs who bring publisher liability suits under an in-
citement theory have consistently faced dismissal of their
claims. In Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Ronny
Zamora and his parents alleged that repetitive viewing of tel-
evision violence offered by the three major networks "stimu-
lated, incited and instigated [Ronny] to duplicate the atroci-
ties he viewed on television."3 2 Plaintiffs' allegations did not
target a particular broadcast, but rather alleged that all
three networks broadcasting of violence over a ten year pe-
riod caused Ronny Zamora to develop a sociopathic personal-
ity.3 3 The court responded to the plaintiffs' incitement theory
by quoting the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in
Whitney v. California: "Advocacy of conduct proscribed by
law is not ... 'a justification for denying free speech where
the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to
indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted
on.' , Dismissing the claim,3 5 the court stated that "the
right of the public to have broad access to [television] pro-
gramming and the right of the broadcaster to disseminate
should not be inhibited by those members of the public who
are particularly sensitive."3 6
Improving upon the broad allegations of violence in
Zamora, a father whose son was stabbed to death by a youth
who had just come from viewing a violent movie, The War-
seded by later cases which recognize a distinction between mere advocacy and
incitement to imminent lawless action.
32. Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979). The pleadings
alleged that Ronny, from the age of 5 to 15, became "involuntarily addicted to
and 'completely subliminally intoxicated' by the extensive viewing of television
violence." Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the repetitive exposure to television vio-
lence incited Ronny to kill his 83-year-old neighbor. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 206 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
35. Id. at 201. The Zamora court held that the claim brought by Ronny and
his parents failed to state a cause of action and was barred by the First Amend-
ment. Id.
36. Id. at 205. See also Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky.
1989) (dismissing a mother's wrongful death action against the manufacturer of
the game "Dungeons & Dragons" claiming that the game dominated her son's
mind causing him to commit suicide; manufacturer had no duty to warn "men-
tally fragile" persons of the unforeseeable dangerous consequences of playing
the game), aff'd, 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990).
19951
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riors, targeted the movie, produced and distributed by Para-
mount Pictures, as the unprotected incitement.3 7 The theme
of the movie involved a gang being pursued through the New
York City subways by hostile youths wielding weapons, and
the film portrayed numerous violent scenes. 38 Due to other
incidents of violence outside movie theaters where the film
was playing, Paramount notified distribution managers to
advise theaters showing The Warriors to hire security guards
and offered to pay for the extra security." Plaintiff's son was
stabbed after exiting the subway some distance from the
movie theater by a youth who had just viewed The Warriors
twice while becoming intoxicated on alcohol that he smuggled
into the theater.4 °
Based on a viewing of the film, the Yakubowicz court de-
termined as a matter of law that the film did not constitute
"incitement" for First Amendment purposes.41 Recognizing
that whether the film constitutes "incitement" is essentially a
question of fact, the court stated that "it is our responsibility
to decide it incidental to our legal determination whether the
movie is protected by the First Amendment." 42 Although the
Supreme Court, in other contexts, has expressed concern
about putting judges in a position of "drawing thin lines" on
an ad hoc basis in determining the "nature of speech,"43 the
37. Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass.
1989).
38. Id. at 1069 ("The film includes numerous scenes of... violence in which
youths battle with knives, guns, and other weapons as they pursue one gang...
through the subways of New York City. Advertising for the film depicted men-
acing youths wielding baseball bats.").
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1069-70.
41. Id. at 1071.
42. Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass.
1989) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505-06 (1984)
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)). The court was
referring to the constitutional obligation, as articulated in Bose and New York
Times, of appellate courts to make an independent review of the whole record to
ensure that a judgment does not infringe on First Amendment freedom of
expression.
43. In the area of defamation, the Supreme Court has struggled with the
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), plurality opinion which
created a test focusing on the nature of the subject matter rather than the sta-
tus of the plaintiff for purposes of constitutional protection. Such a test re-
quires judges to determine as a matter of law whether speech falls into one
category or another, i.e., matters of public concern or matters of private con-
cern. Justice Marshall's dissent articulated concern about putting judges in the
role of determining what is and is not a matter of public concern. Id. at 79. In
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Yakubowicz court had little difficulty, upon viewing The War-
riors, in concluding that it did not fall within the unprotected
speech category of incitement.
The present political climate makes success in a case like
Yakubowicz more likely in the future. With presidential can-
didates making violence on television and in movies an issue
in the 1996 presidential campaign, violence portrayed on
movie screens and television has become a national political
concern. As Congress debates the issue, and discussion of the
"V-Chip" 44 makes national news, regulation of the film and
television industry is likely to occur over the protests of First
Amendment absolutists. Whether regulation is self-imposed
or forced on the industry by Congress, cases similar to
Yabukowicz, Zamora, and Olivia N. are likely to survive mo-
tions for dismissal and summary judgments. These motions
would survive based on the existence of regulations that ar-
guably could establish both duty and causation of a prima fa-
cie case. Of course, any regulation must survive the First
Amendment challenges that are likely to arise before courts
might be willing to recognize tort actions in these type of
cases.
The incitement theory has been rejected in three other
contexts involving rock music and lyrics,45 a Hustler maga-
zine article on autoerotic asphyxiation,46 and a how-to diet
book.47 In McCollum v. CBS, Inc., the parents of a nineteen
year-old who committed suicide while listening to rock music
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court retreated from the
test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality, agreeing with Justice Marshall's Ro-
senbloom dissent that state and federal judges should not be forced to "draw
thin lines" on an ad hoc basis in deciding which publications represent "core"
speech and which do not.
However, later Supreme Court decisions appear to have resurrected a mod-
ified Rosenbloom test. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985) (determining that credit reports do not constitute commer-
cial speech for First Amendment purposes), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983) (articulating a test of content, form, and context to determine whether
speech is a matter of public concern or private concern).
44. The V-Chip refers to a special circuit installed in televisions which can
block specific channels, thus preventing violent and sexually explicit program-
ming from being viewed in the home by children and those opposed to such
programming.
45. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988).
46. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
47. Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa.
1991).
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sued the artist and publisher contending that the music was
the proximate cause of their son's suicide.48 On the night of
his suicide, John McCollum listened over and over again to
Blizzard of Oz, Diary of a Madman, and Speak of the Devil.
These recordings were made by John "Ozzy" Osbourne.4 9
One of the songs on the albums that McCollum was listening
to when he shot himself was called "Suicide Solution" which
included lyrics stating that "suicide is the only way out."5"
Recognizing that the First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech and expression extend to all artistic and
literary expression, whether in music, concerts, plays, pic-
tures, or books, the court determined that absent an incite-
ment, the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the First Amend-
ment.5 The McCollum court held that the incitement theory
did not apply because music lyrics and poetry cannot be con-
strued to contain the requisite "call to action" under the
Brandenburg incitement test.5 2
The court labeled John McCollum an emotionally fragile
person whose adverse reaction to the music was not foresee-
able to the defendants.5" Courts are understandably reluc-
tant to draw a causal connection between the challenged pub-
lication and a suicide.54 However, cases such as these have
prompted "grass-roots" organizations such as the Parent Mu-
48. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
49. Id. at 189-90.
50. Id. at 190-91.
51. Id. at 192 (citing Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (First
Amendment protects non-obscene nude dancing)).
52. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
Reasonable persons understand musical lyrics and poetic conventions
as the figurative expressions which they are. No rational person would
or could believe otherwise nor would they mistake musical lyrics and
poetry for literal commands or directives to immediate action. To do so
would indulge a fiction which neither common sense nor the First
Amendment will permit.
Id. at 194.
53. Id. at 198.
54. See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1990) (suicide
of plaintiff's son not caused by the game "Dungeons & Dragons"; courts are
reluctant to recognize suicide as a proximate consequence of a defendant's
wrongful act); Scott A. Hampton, Anatomy of a Suicide: Media Liability for
Audience Acts of Violence, 9 Loy. ENT. L.J. 95, 108-10 (1989) ("[C]ausation...
presents unique difficulties of proof in so-called 'causing suicide' cases.").
[Vol. 36
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sic Resource Center to lobby Congress for mandatory record
labeling.55
The incitement theory has been equally unsuccessful in
written publication cases. In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,
which involved a youth who accidentally hung himself after
reading a magazine article, the district court held that an ar-
ticle is not a product for purposes of product liability claims,
but may constitute incitement.5 6 On August 6, 1981, a young
boy found the body of his fourteen year-old friend Troy hang-
ing by a belt from a closet door; a Hustler magazine was lying
at Troy's feet opened to an article titled "Orgasm of Death."57
The article described the practice of autoerotic asphyxiation
which "entails masturbation while 'hanging' oneself in order
to temporarily cut off the blood supply to the brain at the mo-
ment of orgasm."58
A jury awarded the plaintiffs $182,000 under a theory
that the article published by Hustler magazine caused Troy to
hang himself by inciting him to try the practice of autoerotic
asphyxiation described in the "Orgasm of Death" article.59
55. See Hampton, supra note 54, at 112; see also TIPPER GORE, RAISING PG
KIDS IN AN X-RATED SocIETY (1988). Another case involving the deleterious ef-
fects of rock music is Vance v. Judas Priest, 1990 WL 130920 (Nev. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 24, 1990). The parents of two teenage boys brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against the band Judas Priest and its distributor CBS claiming that their
sons' suicide pact was caused by the lyrics in combination with the beat of the
music of Judas Priest's album Stained Class. The parents' claims for negli-
gence and incitement were dismissed. The parents then brought a claim alleg-
ing that the album contained subliminal messages which caused the suicides.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court considered whether subliminal
messages are speech, and if so, whether the messages are protected by the First
Amendment. The court concluded that the subliminal messages are not speech,
and even if the court assumed, arguendo, that the messages are speech, they
would constitute an invasion of privacy. The court denied the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment. Id.
56. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex.
1983), rev'd, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
57. See Lisa A. Powell, Products Liability and the First Amendment: The
Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503, 505-06 (1984) (dis-
cussing the facts of Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.
Tex. 1983), in the context of a products liability framework).
58. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
59. Id. at 1019 (reversing the jury verdict). The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' first complaint alleging claims of strict liability and negligent publica-
tion contending that the article was either an attractive nuisance for which
Hustler magazine had a duty of social responsibility or that the article was a
dangerous instrumentality or a defective product. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987),
1995]
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Although the district court sustained the allegations of incite-
ment and allowed the case to proceed to trial, the appellate
court reversed, finding that incitement was not a valid theory
in this case. 60 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on
the incitement theory's inapplicability to the Herceg facts in
stating that the "root of incitement theory appears to have
been grounded in concern over crowd behavior."
61
Despite the fact that the Hustler publication involved
nonpolitical speech, the appellate court was unpersuaded to
apply a less stringent standard than the Brandenburg test.
62
According to two of the three judges, such an approach
"would not only be hopelessly complicated but would raise
substantial concern that the worthiness of speech might be
judged by majoritarian notions of political and social propri-
ety and morality."63 Concerned with a vague standard, the
court eschewed an approach which would determine post-
publication "that an article discussing a dangerous idea negli-
gently helped bring about a real injury" thus avoiding the
shield of the First Amendment simply because the published
idea can be identified as "bad."6 4 The court did not explain
how such an approach would be different from any other
speech case in which a court first determines if the chal-
lenged speech falls within or outside the categories of First
Amendment protection.65 The majority opinion, however, left
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). The district court granted the plaintiffs leave
to amend suggesting that an incitement theory may be maintainable. Id. The
case went to trial on an incitement theory, and the plaintiffs received a jury
award totaling $182,000. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1019.
60. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023. "The crucial element to lowering the First
Amendment shield [under an incitement theory] is the imminence of the
threatened evil.... [No fair reading of [the article] can make its content advo-
cacy, let alone incitement to engage in the practice." Id. at 1022-23.
61. Id. at 1023 (quoting John Stuart Mill in his dissertation, On Liberty:
"An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property
is robbery ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press,
but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob as-
sembled before the house of a corn-dealer."). "Incitement cases usually concern
a state effort to punish the arousal of a crowd to commit a criminal action." Id.
62. Id. at 1024.
63. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (upon viewing the movie
The Warriors, the court in Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989), determined that the movie did not constitute an
incitement).
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open the question whether the plaintiffs could have estab-
lished a cause of action under a theory of negligence. 6
In her opinion, Judge Jones concurred in the reversal
only because the plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's
dismissal of their claims based on negligence.6 7 While agree-
ing that an incitement theory was not applicable, Judge
Jones characterized the Hustler article as pornography, and
therefore, found no First Amendment barriers to a theory of
liability based on negligence. 68 She suggested a two-prong
analysis in cases such as Herceg which consider a publisher's
liability for the harm occasioned on third persons caused by
or in reliance upon the publication.
Judge Jones' analysis began with an examination of the
publication. Disagreeing with the majority opinion, Judge
Jones recognized that First Amendment analysis is an exer-
cise in line-drawing, and that it is up to judges to determine
where specific speech falls in the hierarchy of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.6 9 Even if the speech is generally pro-
tected, the interest in protecting such speech balanced
against other state interests might be lessened.7 °
66. The court was mistaken in its statement that "[mere negligence...
cannot form the basis of liability under the incitement doctrine any more than
it can under the libel doctrine." Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024. See Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (state libel laws may impose liability based on
negligence when the plaintiff is a private figure and/or the speech pertains to a
private matter). However, the court continued that it would not address
whether the plaintiffs could establish a cause of action under a theory of negli-
gence because the plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's dismissal of its
first complaint alleging liability based on negligence. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024-
25.
67. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1025 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
68. Id. (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
69. Id. at 1027 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Jones states:
First Amendment analysis is an exercise in line-drawing between the
legitimate interests of society to regulate itself and the paramount ne-
cessity of encouraging the robust and uninhibited flow of debate which
is the life-blood of government by the people. That some of the lines
are blurred or irregular does not, however, prove the majority's propo-
sition that it would be hopelessly complicated to delineate between pro-
tected and unprotected speech in this case.
Id. (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
70. Id. at 1028. (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Jones sug-
gested looking to defamation cases in which recovery of damages is permitted
(under less than an actual malice standard) as "an analogous framework." Id.
She cited Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758
(1985), in which the Supreme Court balanced the state interest in that case
against the First Amendment interest at stake. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028
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The second part of the analysis entails an examination of
the reasons for protecting the challenged speech under the
First Amendment against the particular publisher's claim to
unlimited constitutional protection.71 Judge Jones viewed
Hustler magazine as a commercial enterprise.7 2 Therefore,
the imposition of tort liability would have no chilling effect on
Hustler so long as a market for such literature continues to
exist. 73 In this way, Judge Jones likened Hustler magazine to
commercial speech in which state regulation by means of tort
recovery is appropriate when "tailored to specific harm and
not broader than necessary to accomplish its purpose.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated strong
reasons why an incitement theory is inappropriate to a claim
by a third party for injuries allegedly caused by or in reliance
on a publication. Nevertheless, two years after Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, a man brought a claim based on an incite-
ment theory against the publisher of a diet book contending
that by following the diet his wife developed complications
and died.75 The plaintiff's wife lost over 100 pounds on Dr.
Linn's diet, which was published in the book When Every-
thing Else Fails... The Last Chance Diet.76 The trial court
dismissed Mr. Smith's complaint on the ground that the diet
book was protected by the First Amendment.77 The appellate
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the book was un-
protected speech in that "it [was] an incitement to immediate
unreflecting action such as the action arising from shouting
(Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). The test of content, form, and context
articulated in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1983), can be employed
to determine whether the speech at issue is a matter of public concern. Herceg,
814 F.2d at 1028 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). While matters of pri-
vate concern are not wholly unprotected, the Court in Dun & Bradstreet found
that such speech is not substantially relative to important state interests.
Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1028 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (5th Cir.
1987) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
72. Id. at 1028-29 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
73. Id. (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
74. Id. at 1029 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
75. Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa.
1991). Mr. Smith brought his claim under multiple theories including (1) in-
citement, (2) negligent publication, and (3) defective products, analogizing his
situation to a drug company selling its marketed drugs without providing a
warning of potential side effects. Id.
76. Id. at 125.
77. Id.
[Vol. 36
PUBLISHERS' LIABILITY
'Fire!' in a crowded theater."78 Mr. Smith's alternative theo-
ries of recovery based on negligent misrepresentation, a prod-
ucts liability notion of a defective product, and failure to warn
were also dismissed by the court.7 9
IV. "GUN FOR HiRE" ADVERTISEMENTS: MODIFIED
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
Two cases involving "gun for hire" advertisements repre-
sent a bridge between the violent publication cases in which
plaintiffs seek recovery for the consequences of a publication
that incites violence and the "how-to" publication cases in
which plaintiffs seek damages for the injuries caused by a
publication intended to induce reliance based on theories of
negligence, product liability, or negligent misrepresentation.
Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.80 and Eimann v.
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.81 present factual situations
in which readers of "gun for hire" advertisements that were
placed in Soldier of Fortune magazine were able to locate or
purchase the services of those willing to commit crimes, even
murder, for the going rate. The surviving families or the vic-
tims of these crimes sued the publisher of the advertisement,
Soldier of Fortune, for damages.
In Braun, a businessman hired a man who placed a "gun
for hire" ad in Soldier of Fortune to kill his business partner,
Richard Braun.82 In Eimann, a husband hired someone
78. Id. (referring to Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater)).
79. Id. at 126. For a discussion of other publisher liability cases alleging
that a publication is a product for purposes of products liability law or a defec-
tive good under the UCC, see Daniel M. Lane, Jr., Publisher Liability for Mate-
rial that Invites Reliance, 66 Tx L.R. 1155, 1158, 1190 (1988) (suggesting a
theory of reckless misrepresentation for injuries by publications that induce the
user's reliance) and Lisa A. Powell, Products Liability and the First Amend-
ment: The Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503, 508,
518 (1984) (suggesting a theory based on products liability law which requires a
duty of disclosure from publishers when publishing material which invites
reliance).
80. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
81. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
82. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993). The ad read as follows: "GUN
FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran.
Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and other special skills.
All jobs considered." Id. Mr. Savage, who placed the ad, testified that the over-
whelming majority of the 30 to 40 calls per week that he received in response to
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through a Soldier of Fortune advertisement to kill his wife. 3
The murders for hire were successful in both cases. The dece-
dent's family in each case sued Soldier of Fortune for wrong-
ful death.8 4 Juries in both cases awarded the plaintiffs sub-
stantial damages.8 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Eimann reversed the jury award. 6 Applying tort principles
to the advertisement, which was considered commercial
speech for First Amendment purposes, the court determined
that under the applicable risk-utility balancing test, 7 Soldier
of Fortune could not be held liable because the advertisement
his ad sought to hire him to engage in criminal activity such as murder, assault
and kidnapping. Id.
83. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 831 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990). Mr. Black, Jr. hired Mr. Hearn
through an ad that Mr. Hearn placed in Soldier of Fortune. The ad read as
follows: "EX-MARINES - - 67-69 'Nam vets - - ex-DI-weapons specialist - - jun-
gle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments U.S. or overseas." Id. Mr.
Hearn estimated that he received ten to twenty calls a day regarding the adver-
tisement, and because of the many inquiries, he was forced to hire a profes-
sional answering service. About ninety percent of the calls received by Mr.
Hearn were requests for illegal acts, including illegal drug activity, jail breaks,
political assassinations, and illegal arms sales. Id. See Donald B. Allegro &
John D. LaDue, Constitutional Law - Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune and "Neg-
ligent Advertising" Actions: Commercial Speech in an Era of Reduced First
Amendment Protection, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 158 n.5 (1989) (discussing
the lower court opinion which permitted the negligence action against Soldier
of Fortune, but was reversed on appeal).
84. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993) (one of the decedent's sons,
Michael Braun, was present when his father was murdered and received
wounds of his own from the gun shots that were fired; in addition to a wrongful
death claim, Michael brought his own claim against Soldier of Fortune for the
personal injuries that he received at the time of his father's death); Eimann v.
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990) (the victim's son and mother brought a wrongful
death action against Soldier of Fortune).
85. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114 (the jury awarded plaintiffs $2 million on their
wrongful death claim and, to Michael Braun for his personal injury claim,
$375,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages; the
punitive damages award was reduced to $2 million); Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833
(the jury awarded plaintiffs $1.9 million in compensatory damages and $7.5
million in punitive damages).
86. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 837.
87. Id. at 834. Applying Texas law, the court considered, according to a
risk-utility balancing test, whether (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plain-
tiff and (2) the standard of conduct required to satisfy the obligation. Id. The
test involved weighing the risk, foreseeability and likelihood of injury from cer-
tain conduct against the conduct's social utility and the burden of guarding
against injury. Id. Adopting Judge Learned Hand's balancing test to deter-
mine whether the ad violated the standard of conduct, the court summed up the
test as follows:
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was ambiguous on its face.8 8 "Given the pervasiveness of ad-
vertising in our society and the important role it plays, we
decline to impose on publishers the obligation to reject all
ambiguous advertisements for products or services that
might pose a threat of harm." 9
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held a jury verdict in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine,
Inc.90 Like the Eimann case, the Braun court applied risk/
utility balancing principles to determine whether the jury's
verdict against the publisher was "an appropriate reconcilia-
tion of [the state's] interest in providing compensation to vic-
tims of tortious conduct with the First Amendment concern
that state law not chill protected speech."9 ' Since Braun
came after Eimann, the court justified its departure from the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion by distinguishing the
case in two important ways.92 Consistent with its constitu-
As [Judge Hand] described it in algebraic terms, liability turns on
whether the burden of adequate precautions, B, is less than the
probability of harm, P, multiplied by the gravity of the resulting injury,
L. In other words, an actor falls below the standard of conduct and
liability attaches when B is less than PL. Conversely, the actor satis-
fies the obligation to protect against unreasonable risks when the bur-
den of adequate precautions - examined in light of the challenged ac-
tion's value - outweighs the probability and gravity of the threatened
harm.
Id. at 835.
88. Id. at 837.
89. Id. at 838. The jury was given a straightforward negligence instruction:
Whether Soldier of Fortune knew or should have known from the face or context
of the challenged ad that it represented an offer to perform illegal acts. Id. at
833. Recognizing that the first amendment does not protect advertising of ille-
gal activity, the court found that the challenged ad was ambiguous. Id. at 837
(citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) (newspaper's placement of employment ads in sex-segregated
columns violated anti-discrimination laws)). For ads that do not dearly offer
illegal activity, the court concluded that a requirement to investigate or to re-
ject every ambiguous ad was too onerous a burden to place on publishers and
the first amendment. Id. at 837-38. But see Michael I. Meyerson, This Gun for
Hire: Dancing in the Dark of the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 267
(1990) (discussing the application of tort principles to classified advertisements
that are either explicitly illegal or those that reasonably suggest illegality; pub-
lisher would reject the clearly illegal ads and can either reject or rephrase the
ambiguous ads to avoid "impermissible innuendo").
90. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
91. Id. at 1115.
92. Of course, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is not bound by the
decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the similarities be-
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tional responsibility to conduct an independent review, the
Braun majority found that the language of the ad was not
ambiguous, and unlike Eimann, it clearly implied that the
advertiser would consider illegal jobs.93 However, the key
distinction centered on the different jury instructions which
were given in each case.
The jury in the Braun case was instructed in part as
follows:
In order to prevail in this case Plaintiffs must prove to
your reasonable satisfaction by a preponderance of the ev-
idence that a reasonable reading of the advertisement in
this case would have conveyed to a magazine publisher,
such as Soldier of Fortune, that this ad presented the
clear and present danger of causing serious harm to the
public from violent criminal activity. The Plaintiffs must
prove that the ad in question contained a clearly identifi-
able unreasonable risk, that the offer in the ad is one to
commit a serious violent crime, including murder.
9 4
Although the court did not comment on such, the jury in-
struction contains the "clear and present danger" language
from the Schenck v. United States and Whitney v. California
incitement cases. 95
Because the jury was instructed to apply a "'modified'
negligence standard under which [Soldier of Fortune] had no
legal duty to investigate the ads it printed,"96 the court con-
cluded that imposing publisher liability in this case was con-
sistent with First Amendment principles.9 7 The court articu-
lated the following rule: "[T]he First Amendment permits a
state to impose upon a publisher liability for compensatory
damages for negligently publishing a commercial advertise-
ment where the ad on its face, and without the need for inves-
tigation, makes it apparent that there is a substantial danger
tween Braun and Eimann, both on the facts and the law, made it difficult for
the Braun court not to address the Eimann decision.
93. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121. Judge Eschbach disagreed with the majority
opinion on the basis that he believed the language of the advertisement was
ambiguous. Id. at 1122 (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1113.
95. See supra note 31.
96. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1118 (11th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
97. Id. at 1119.
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of harm to the public."98 In response to the publisher's argu-
ment that the judgment would force the magazine out of busi-
ness and silence its protected speech, the court stated that
the First Amendment interest in protected speech does not
entitle "publishers and broadcasters [to] enjoy an uncondi-
tional and indefeasible immunity from [tort] liability."99 The
rule articulated in Braun presents a good compromise be-
tween tort liability for the negligent publication of commer-
cial advertisements and First Amendment protection. By im-
posing liability without a corresponding duty to investigate,
only those advertisements which facially present a clearly
identifiable unreasonable risk will subject publishers to lia-
bility. However, the Braun rule may give more protection to
commercial advertisement than is necessary to safeguard
First Amendment principles. As Professor Meyerson has
suggested, a rule imposing liability on ambiguous advertise-
ments would not necessitate an obligation to investigate. 10 0
The only additional burden on publishers would be to reject
or to edit the ambiguous ad; this is already a step in the pub-
lication process. A rule that requires publishers to police
their ads more carefully may be an incentive to create more
social responsibility among publishers without chilling First
Amendment speech.
Like these commercial advertisement cases, courts that
decide claims against publishers of "how to" books are reti-
cent to impose a duty to investigate upon the publishers. Be-
cause a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk may not be
facially detectable, it may be more difficult in the "how to"
publication cases to fashion a rule which reconciles the state's
interest in providing compensation to victims of tortious con-
duct with the First Amendment concern that the fear of lia-
bility may chill protected speech.
98. Id. Citing to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the court
recognized that a different rule would apply to presumed damages or punitive
damages. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119 n.7.
99. Id. at 1119 n.8 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341
(1974)).
100. Meyerson, supra note 89, at 275-76.
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V. "How To" PUBLICATIONS: PRODUCTS OR SPEECH?
A. Negligent Publication
So long as the publisher has neither authored nor guar-
anteed the accuracy of the publication, injuries sustained by
plaintiff acting in reliance on information contained in the
publication have not been redressable under a negligence
theory. As a matter of policy, courts in these situations have
uniformly held that "absent guaranteeing or authoring the
contents of the publication, a publisher has no duty to investi-
gate and warn its readers of the accuracy of the contents of
its publications." 10 1
In Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., a
newlywed couple in preparation for their honeymoon trip to
Hawaii purchased a copy of Fodor's Hawaii 1988 travel
guide. 10 2 Based on the information acquired from the Fodor's
guide, the honeymooners decided to go to Kekaha Beach to
body surf, swim, and relax. 10 3 After arriving at their destina-
tion, Joseph Birmingham sustained personal injuries from
body surfing in ocean waters off Kekaha Beach. 104 The
Birminghams sued Fodor's claiming that it was negligent in
failing to warn them of the dangerous swimming conditions
at Kekaha Beach. 10 5
101. Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 75 (Haw.
1992). But see Mark v. Zulli, No. CV 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 1994);
David v. Jackson, No. 540624 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1994)(unpublished opin-
ions discussed in News Notes, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, (Nov. 1, 1994)).
In these cases the plaintiffs brought suit against the authors of The Courage to
Heal and The Courage to Heal Workbook, self-help books intended to assist vic-
tims of child sexual abuse, even if they have repressed memories of the abuse.
The plaintiffs alleged that the books (and several therapists) induced them to
believe that memories of childhood sexual abuse were real. The plaintiffs
sought recovery for the emotional damages suffered by them and their families.
Both cases were dismissed. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs sued the au-
thors, the court found that authorship created no duty. "The fact that [the au-
thors] intended [the books] to provide information and guidance to the general
public does not give rise to a duty to every member of the public who reads the
book." Id.
102. Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 73.
103. Id. The section in the travel guide upon which the Birminghams relied
in deciding to visit Kekaha Beach states the following: "Kekaha Beach Park on
the south shore is a long, luxurious strip of sand recalling the beaches of Cali-
fornia. Great for dune buggy action!" Id. at 73 n.1.
104. Id. at 73.
105. Id. The Birminghams sued Fodor's, the State, and the County alleging
in part that: (1) the defendants recommended, encouraged and invited plaintiffs
and other members of the public to use Kekaha Beach and the adjacent waters;
[Vol. 36
PUBLISHERS' LIABILITY
The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
granting of summary judgment in favor of Fodor's.10 6 Upon a
consideration of publisher liability cases from various juris-
dictions, the court concluded that policy reasons and First
Amendment concerns mandated that the courts restrain from
imposing a new duty on publishers. 10 7 "Wle are reluctant to
impose a new duty upon members of our society without any
logical, sound, and compelling reasons taking into considera-
tion the social and human relationships of our society."
1 0 8
Agreeing with other courts which have considered such cases,
the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that a publisher has no
(2) the defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, that the wave and water conditions along the Beach were dangerous to
swimmers; (3) the defendants failed to warn of the dangerous conditions; and
(4) the failure to warn caused the Birminghams' injuries and damages. Id.
106. Id. at 83.
107. Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 76. Cases uniformly refuse to impose a duty
on publishers to investigate the contents of their publications. See First Equity
Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1989) (losses
suffered by investors who relied on inaccurate financial publications to their
detriment may not be recovered); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp.
1216, 1216-17 (D. Md. 1988) (publisher of medical textbook not liable in negli-
gence to nursing student who suffered personal injury after following treatment
described in book); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 283-84 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (publisher of book titled The Complete Metalsmith not liable to plaintiffs
who were injured in an explosion while mixing a mordant according to the
book's instructions); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267
(m. App. Ct. 1985) (publisher not liable to plaintiff who injured his hand while
following instructions in book on how to make tools); Roman v. City of New
York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (Planned Parenthood not liable for
misstatement in contraceptive pamphlet); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490
N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 1986) (Wall Street Journal not liable for inaccurate de-
scription of certain corporate bonds); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (publisher of diet book not liable for death caused by complications
from following the diet), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991); cf. Libertelli v. Hoffman-
La Roche, 7 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) 1734, 1736 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (publisher of Phy-
sician's Desk Reference not liable for failure to include drug warning because
the book was similar to a published advertisement of products rather than a
reference book); Mark v. Zulli, No. CV 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 1994) and
David v. Jackson, No. 540624 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1994) (author and pub-
lisher of book intending to assist victims of child sexual abuse to revive memo-
ries of such abuse not liable to readers and their families for resulting emo-
tional damages); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974) (magazine publisher not liable for injuries caused by defective fireworks
advertised in its magazine); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d
974, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (truck association not liable for injuries caused by
products manufactured according to industry standards adopted, approved and
published by association).
108. Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 76 (Haw.
1992).
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duty to investigate the accuracy of the contents of its publica-
tion, no duty to warn its readers that the information is in-
complete and not to be relied on, or that the publisher does
not guarantee the accuracy of the information. 10 9
The Hawaii Supreme Court discussed and relied upon
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Winter v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons."' In Winter, mushroom enthusiasts who be-
came severely ill from picking and eating mushrooms after
relying on information in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms
brought suit against the publisher."' The plaintiffs relied on
the descriptions in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms in decid-
ing which mushrooms were safe to eat.1 1 2 After eating the
mushrooms, the plaintiffs became critically ill and required
liver transplants.1 1
3
Plaintiffs advanced many alternative theories of recovery
including products liability, breach of warranty, negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, and false representation.' 4 As
to the negligence claim, the court refused to recognize a duty
on a publisher to investigate the accuracy of the contents of
the books it publishes.1 15 "Were we tempted to create this
duty, the gentle tug of the First Amendment and the values
embodied therein would remind us of the social costs."
1 1 6
Recognizing that a publisher may voluntarily assume a
duty to investigate and guarantee the contents of its publica-
tion, a duty would then exist exposing publishers to possible
liability for negligent publication.'1 7 The court declined to
find that a publisher should warn either (1) that the informa-
tion in the book is not complete and therefore, a consumer
should not fully rely on it, or (2) that the publisher has not
109. Id.
110. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1034.
112. Id. The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms is a reference guide containing in-
formation on the habitat, collection, and cooking of mushrooms. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1037.
116. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
117. Id. at 1037 n.7 (citing Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521
(Ct. App. 1969) (Good Housekeeping held liable for defective product that it
guaranteed by endorsing the product with the Good Housekeeping's Con-
sumer's Guaranty Seal. In Hanberry, the defendant had made an independent
examination of the product which were shoes guaranteed not to be slippery and
issued an express, limited warranty.)). Id.
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investigated the text and cannot guarantee its accuracy. 1 '
"We will not introduce a duty we have just rejected by renam-
ing it a 'mere' warning label."" 9
The court assumed that informing the public that a pub-
lisher does not guarantee the contents of its publications is
tantamount to imposing on a publisher a duty to investigate.
The former is similar to truth in advertising disclosures, and
it is difficult to see how such disclosures would chill publish-
ers' First Amendment rights. In fact, a requirement that a
publisher notify the consuming public that it is neither au-
thor nor guarantor of the contents of its publications provides
information that may foster intelligent, well-informed eco-
nomic decisions. 1
20
B. Strict Liability Under Products Liability Law
The plaintiffs in both Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Pub-
lications, Inc. and Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons argue strict
liability claims premised on the theory that the publications
at issue are "products."12 1 A producer of a product may be
held to a strict liability standard when the product is defec-
tively designed, when it contains a dangerous design or de-
fect, and/or when there is a failure to warn about a danger
attendant upon the use of the product. 122 Strict liability prin-
118. Id. at 1037. As to the first warning, the court reasoned that a publisher
would not know what warnings were required without analyzing 'the factual
contents of the book. Id. In somewhat circular reasoning, the court stated:
"With respect to the second, such a warning is unnecessary given that no pub-
lisher has a duty as a guarantor." Id. at 1038.
119. Id. at 1037-38.
120. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (holding that "even if the First Amend-
ment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision
making in a democracy," both individual consumers and society in general have
strong interests in the free flow of commercial information).
121. Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 77 (Haw.
1992); Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991).
122. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 98, at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984). Several cases considering strict liability claims
have cited section 402(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states in
relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
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ciples further the "cause of accident prevention ... [by] the
elimination of the necessity of proving negligence." 28
The Winter court, following a long line of cases that have
declined to extend products liability law to ideas or knowl-
edge published in a book,' 24 recognized that products liability
"is geared to the tangible world."' 25 The court states the
following:
A book containing Shakespeare's sonnets consists of two
parts, the material and print therein, and the ideas and
expression thereof. The first may be a product, but the
second is not. The latter, were Shakespeare alive, would
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Put-
nam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co.,
694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988).
123. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 93 (5th ed. 1984)). "Under products lia-
bility law, strict liability is imposed on the theory that '[t]he costs of damaging
events due to defectively dangerous products can best be borne by the enterpris-
ers who make and sell these products.'" Id. at 1034-35 (quoting W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 92-93 (5th ed.
1984)).
124. See, e.g., Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md.
1988) (holding a publisher of a medical textbook not strictly liable for the con-
tents of its publication because strict liability has not been extended to the dis-
semination of an idea or knowledge in books); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp.
282, 284 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding there can be no duty to warn of "defective
ideas" upon publishers of information supplied by third-party authors); Walter
v. Bauer, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that a publisher of a
textbook containing science experiments is not strictly liable for defective de-
sign and failure to warn). Courts, however, have applied strict liability to the
narrow area of published maps or charts. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States,
767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a graphic instrument approach
chart to be a product subject to strict liability law), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101
(1986); accord Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983)
(reasoning that "the mass production and marketing of these charts requires
Jeppesen to bear the costs of accidents that are proximately caused by defects
in the charts"); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339,
341-42 (9th Cir. 1981) (approach charts are "products"). The underlying theory
for applying strict liability to these kinds of charts is the analogy of a nautical
chart or an airline chart to other instruments of navigation such as a compass
or radar finder which, when defective, will be dangerous. J.B. Lippincott, Co.,
694 F. Supp. at 1217.
125. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1034.
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be governed by copyright laws; the laws of libel, to the ex-
tent consistent with the First Amendment; and the laws
of misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negli-
gence, and mistake. These doctrines applicable to the sec-
ond part are aimed at the delicate issues that arise with
respect to intangibles such as ideas and expression. 26
The court acknowledged both the appeal and the danger
of the involuntary spreading of costs of injuries occurred in
reliance on incomplete or defective information in "how to"
publications. 127 If strict liability concepts were applied to
words and ideas, First Amendment principles protecting the
"unfettered exchange of ideas" would be chilled. 128 Echoing
the sentiments of a New York court, the Winter court ques-
tioned whether, under strict liability standards, "any author
[or publisher] [would] wish to be exposed ... for writing on a
topic which might result in physical injury? e.g., How to cut
trees; how to keep bees?"12
9
While the cases have declined to extend products liability
law to publishers, a few courts have left open the question
whether author liability would be similarly limited. "Author
liability for errors in the content of books, designs, or draw-
ings is not firmly defined and will depend on the nature of the
publication, on the intended audience, on causation in fact,
and on the foreseeability of damage."'3 0 In Lewin v. Mc-
Creight, a Michigan court declined to impose a duty to warn
of defective ideas upon publishers of information supplied by
third party authors because of concern that such a duty
would chill free speech.' 3 ' However, the burden would not be
as weighty if the publisher contributed to the content of the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1035.
128. Id. ("We accept the risk that words and ideas have wings we cannot clip
and which carry them we know not where.").
129. Id. at 1035 (citing Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (Sup. Ct.
1981) (student injured following science experiment described in textbook does
not have a cause of action against the publisher based on a theory of products
liability), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App.
Div. 1982). See Brett L. Myers, Read at Your Own Risk: Publisher Liability for
Defective How-To Books, 45 ARK. L. REV. 699 (1992) (discussing the Winter case
and suggesting the application of strict liability under section 402A of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts to publishers and sellers of highly technical, highly fac-
tual "How To" books and other reference materials).
130. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
131. Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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book.13 2 The court also considered that a publisher would
have greater responsibility where the risk of harm is "plain
and severe such as a book titled How to Make Your Own
Parachute ."133
The dismissal of two claims against the authors of The
Courage to Heal and The Courage to Heal Workbook, books
intended to help victims of child sexual abuse to revive re-
pressed memories of the abuse, suggests that authorship of a
self-help book creates no duty to the consuming public.1
3 4
These cases present a possible anomaly in the law. Conceiva-
bly, if the readers of the Courage to Heal books had received
the same information from the authors in a therapist/client
context, the plaintiffs might have had a cause of action
against those therapists for malpractice. Professionals who
would not be shielded from liability for negligent advice given
in a therapist/client relationship may be shielded from liabil-
ity for disseminating the same advice to the consuming public
via self-help books. 13 5
C. Negligent Misrepresentation
The publisher of The Courage to Heal was sued in an-
other lawsuit for negligent misrepresentation. 13 6 The first
publication of The Courage to Heal included a list of attorneys
who could help women survivors of child abuse. 137 The plain-
tiff, an adult victim of child abuse, purchased and read de-
fendant's book.' 8 She contacted one of the attorneys recom-
mended and paid him a retainer; however, he failed to
provide the promised legal services. 13 9 The plaintiff sued the
publisher contending that it had misrepresented the qualifi-
132. Id. (implying in dicta that the burden of determining if the content is
accurate is less if the publisher contributes to the content of the book).
133. Id.
134. See supra note 101.
135. Perhaps the First Amendment should protect professionals who provide
information and guidance to the general public through publications, even if the
same information could form the basis of a malpractice claim if given in a pro-
fessional/client relationship. Similar to the distinctions made in the violent
publication cases between true incitement, i.e., the Weirum case, and the cases
discussed in Part III above, there is no "real time" interaction with clients or
live importuning with real people in the publication cases. See supra note 27.
136. Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D. Mass.
1994).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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cations of the attorneys listed in The Courage to Heal.140 The
court cited a number of cases which refused to hold publish-
ers liable for non-defamatory negligent misrepresentations
relied upon by readers. 14 ' The court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the publisher concluding that the plaintiff's
claim of negligent misrepresentation was an "untenable legal
theory." 142 Concerned about opening a Pandora's box, the
court stated that "[tihe burden placed upon publishers to
check every fact in the books they publish is both impractical
and outside the realm of their contemplated legal duties."'43
Other plaintiffs have been equally unsuccessful in hold-
ing publishers liable for negligent misrepresentations. In
Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.,'" a plaintiff was injured
when a tool he was making in accordance with directions in
The Making of Tools shattered. 145 The plaintiff alleged that
the publisher had a duty to provide adequate and safe in-
structions and warnings to intended purchasers and users of
its publication.146 Relying on section 311 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and its comments, the plaintiff argued that
liability for negligent misrepresentations "extends to any per-
son who ... undertakes to give information to another, and
knows or should realize that the safety of the person... may
depend upon the accuracy of the information."' 47
Although the plaintiff argued that the court could, con-
sistent with First Amendment jurisprudence, distinguish bad
advice in "how to" books from "a treatise on politics, religion,
philosophy, interpersonal relationships, or the like,"'48 the
court responded "that such a distinction would lead to further
First Amendment problems involving content-based discrimi-
nation." 49 Finding no precedent for extending section 311 of
140. Id. (alleging that the book contained false and unverified facts).
141. Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (D.
Mass. 1994); see supra note 107.
142. Barden, 863 F. Supp. at 45.
143. Id. Such a burden would "produce just such a chilling effect on the free
flow of ideas as first amendment jurisprudence has sought to avoid." Id. (citing
Geiger v. Dell Publishing Co., 719 F.2d 515, 515 (1st Cir. 1983) (suing a publish-
ing company for defamation contained in a non-fiction work)).
144. 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1264 (11. App. Dist. Ct. 1985).
145. Alm, 480 N.E.2d at 1264.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1266 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 cmt. b
(1965)).
148. Id. at 1267.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts to publishers of informa-
tion supplied to third parties, the court affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiff's complaint.150 The court acknowledged the
respective rights of society to receive knowledge, and publish-
ers to disseminate knowledge, concluding that liability
"would serve neither justice nor the public interest because of
its manifestly chilling effect."151
In order to reconcile First Amendment concerns with the
state interest in protecting persons relying on "how to" publi-
cations from injury, the plaintiff suggested that courts could
first determine whether the challenged speech was "core
speech." Then, depending upon the results, courts could ap-
ply a balancing test.1 52 Because First Amendment jurispru-
dence has consistently involved balancing the interest in pro-
tecting particular speech against a particular state
interest, 153 it is doubtful that such an approach would involve
problems of content-based discrimination.1
5 1
150. Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1266-67 (111. App.
Dist. Ct. 1985). The court cited the following precedents: Demuth Dev. Corp. v.
Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (no liability imposed on the
publisher of a chemical encyclopedia for allegedly misrepresenting the toxicity
of a chemical used in plaintiff's product); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (publisher of a cookbook not liable for failure to warn that an
uncooked ingredient is poisonous if eaten), rev. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla.
1977); MacKown v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526 (IlM. App.
Ct. 1937) (no liability for injuries caused by a dandruff remedy recommended in
an article published by the defendant); Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (publisher not liable for injuries caused by defective
fireworks advertised in its magazine).
151. Alm, 480 N.E.2d at 1267 (citing to Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co.,
432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (citations omitted)).
152. See supra notes 43, 69 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of some of the cases discussed in Part IV and a pro-
posed theory of liability based on a variation of negligent misrepresentation
under § 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see Daniel M. Lane, Jr., Pub-
lisher Liability for Material That Invites Reliance, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1155, 1190
(1988) (suggesting a theory of liability under a "reckless misrepresentation"
standard which would "compensate[ ] consumers who are injured by reckless
publication while carefully limiting liability to minimize any chilling effect on
the exercise of free speech") and Steven J. Weingarten, Tort Liability for Non-
libelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J.
744 (1984) (recommending a theory of recovery for physical injuries caused by
nonlibelous negligent statements based on a modified misrepresentation
theory).
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D. Publication as a "Good" Under UCC - Implied
Warranty
In Cardozo v. True, the court proposed a novel theory of
recovery for a purchaser and user of a cookbook who became
ill due to a failure by the author, publisher, and seller of the
cookbook to adequately warn that uncooked ingredients used
in a recipe were poisonous. 15 5 The plaintiff sued the retail
book dealer from which she purchased the book titled Trade
Winds Cookery.156  Under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), the plaintiff brought her claim against the retail
book dealer for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability. 157
Distinguishing between the tangible properties of books
- the printing and binding - and the thoughts and ideas
conveyed in them, the court concluded that only the physical
properties of the books are "goods" for purposes of the UCC's
implied warranty of merchantability.15 8 "It is unthinkable
. . . that a book seller [would have a duty] to evaluate the
thought processes of the many authors and publishers of the
hundreds and often thousands of books which the merchant
offers for sale."159
The court recognized that imposing liability on a book-
seller under an implied warranty of merchantability would
violate First Amendment precedents which hold that there
is no liability without fault on publishers of defamatory
155. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 353
So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977). Plaintiff got sick when she ate a small slice of uncooked
Dasheen roots. Id. at 1054. The plaintiff was following a recipe in the cookbook
for the preparation and cooking of the Dasheen plant, commonly known as "ele-
phant's ears." Id. The recipe did not warn that the uncooked Dasheen roots are
poisonous. Id.
156. Id. at 1054. Trade Winds Cookery is an anthology of recipes using tropi-
cal fruits and vegetables selected and prepared by its author, Norma True. Id.
The book was published by a Virginia corporation which sold the book to Ellie's
Book and Stationery, Inc., one of the defendants. Id.
157. Id. at 1055.
158. Cardozo, 342 So. 2d. at 1056.
159. Id. Citing cases that deny publisher liability for the injuries caused by
products advertised in its publications, the court states: "The principles of law
and considerations of public policy which support denial of liability of a pub-
lisher in these instances more urgently mandates [sic] denial of liability of a
newsdealer." Id.
1995] 101
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
speech. 160 Addressing First Amendment concerns, the court
stated the following:
[I]deas hold a privileged position in our society. They are
not equivalent to commercial products. Those who are in
the business of distributing the ideas of other people per-
form a unique and essential function. To hold those who
perform this essential function liable, regardless of fault,
when an injury results would severely restrict the flow of
the ideas they distribute.' 6 '
The courts have consistently rejected theories of liability
in these cases which construe publications as products and
impose a strict liability standard. Additionally, courts have
eschewed any liability based on negligence for fear that im-
posing a duty to investigate the contents of its publications on
the publisher would chill speech protected by the First
Amendment.
It is interesting to note that apart from the defamation
cases,162 none of these publisher liability cases considered a
balancing test. While balancing approaches to constitutional
law have been criticized,16 3 it is widely recognized that bal-
ancing has attained legitimacy particularly in First Amend-
ment cases.
1 6 4
A survey of the cases suggests that, First Amendment
concerns notwithstanding, courts are reluctant to extend tort
liability for injuries caused by or in reliance on publications
as a matter of policy. In the case of defamation, it is the pub-
lication itself that causes injury. Therefore, courts may be
more willing to balance First Amendment concerns against a
state's interest in protecting reputation, especially when the
160. Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1056 (citing Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
161. Id. at 1056-57.
162. But see Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Jones, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
163. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (discussing some criticisms of the wide use of balancing
in constitutional law including, but not limited to, the following: balancing as a
method of constitutional adjudication replicates the job of the legislature; bal-
ancing treats interests equal to rights; balancing attempts to avoid the hard
constitutional choices in lieu of cost-benefit calculations; constitutional
supremacy diluted because balancing assigns values along a continuum rather
than recognizing that a constitutional judgment "trumps").
164. See supra note 16.
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causation between the challenged speech and alleged injury
is not in question.
Common sense dictates that courts recognize the impor-
tant state interest in safeguarding persons from physical
harm. Certainly, the importance of providing remedies for
victims of physical harm is as paramount as providing reme-
dies for victims of reputational injury. One possible explana-
tion for the difference in the courts' treatment of defamation
cases from other publisher liability cases is an unwillingness
by the courts to recognize a causal relationship between the
challenged speech and the resulting injuries. 165
Even in the "how to" publication cases, where the direct
link between the challenged speech and resulting injuries
seems easily identifiable, the connection may be too tenuous.
The imposition of liability would presuppose that a consumer
of the publication followed the directions correctly or used the
information exactly as intended. 16 6 One way to avoid the
problems of comparative negligence and assigning fault is to
adopt a strict liability standard. However, as the cases indi-
cate, a strict liability rule would have a chilling effect on pro-
tected speech and a staggering effect on the commercial world
and our economic system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has explored a variety of cases in which
plaintiffs have attempted to recover damages for injuries al-
legedly caused by or in reliance on a publication. Although
the theories upon which plaintiffs bring their claims are va-
ried, the courts almost uniformly deny relief. Courts are re-
luctant to extend the law of torts to these publisher liability
cases for fear of chilling First Amendment speech and for fear
of the "slippery slope." The cases discussed present different
challenges to both tort law and First Amendment principles.
Therefore, different solutions are warranted.
The incitement theory of liability has proven untenable
to plaintiffs seeking recovery for the physical injuries occa-
sioned by violent publications. The effect of violence por-
165. Causation, or foreseeability of the risk, is one element considered in es-
tablishing the element of a duty. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
166. Of course, most jurisdictions follow comparative negligence rules, but it
would be extremely difficult for publishers to prove as an affirmative defense
negligent use of its publication by an unknown (until a lawsuit is filed) plaintiff.
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trayed in television programming, movies, and rock music on
viewers' subsequent violent behavior is an issue which the
law will have to address in the future. As studies regarding
the social impact of graphic violence share more decisive re-
sults, the courts may come to recognize that publications
which contain such violence deserve less First Amendment
protection.167 "One day, medical or other sciences with or
without the cooperation of programmers may convince the
FCC or the courts that the delicate balance of First Amend-
ment rights should be altered to permit some additional limi-
tations in programming."
168
In the meantime, a balancing test such as that suggested
by Judge Jones in her dissenting opinion in Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine presents a good solution to these violent publica-
tion cases. 16 9 First Amendment principles do not demand
that publishers be entitled to publish violence with impunity.
Allowing civil damages for the effects of violent publications
when appropriate under a balancing test might encourage
professional responsibility among publishers of TV program-
ming and rock music.
170
Commercial advertisement cases present an attempt to
resolve the state interest in compensating victims of crimes
instigated by ads soliciting illegal activity with the First
Amendment objective that threat of civil liability not chill
protected speech. Applying a negligence standard creates a
duty in the publisher to reject ads which are clearly illegal
and to reject or edit ambiguous ads without obligating the
publisher to investigate every advertisement. This is not an
onerous burden for two reasons: (1) under existing law,
167. Issues of constitutional proportions have been decided based on empiri-
cal studies and statistics. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990) (under an Equal Protection challenge, intermediate scrutiny applied
to benign race conscious measures by Congress favoring licensing of broadcast
stations to minorities when supported by studies which demonstrate a link be-
tween minority ownership of broadcast stations and an increase in the diversity
of viewpoints presented over the airwaves).
168. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp. 199, 206-07
(S.D. Fla. 1979).
169. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
170. Although it has been urged before by grass-roots parent and church or-
ganizations, the TV and recording industries might institute a voluntary rating
system similar to the motion picture and film industry or some other system to
warn the consuming public of violence portrayed in its publications. This could
be a duty prescribed by the professional guilds and not imposed by law. See
supra note 55.
[Vol. 36104
PUBLISHERS' LIABILITY
clearly illegal advertisements are not protected; and (2) sub-
mitted copy of advertisements are routinely screened for
readability and possible editing as part of the publication
process.
The "how to" publication cases would appear, on first
glance, to present the easiest path for permitting tort actions
consistent with First Amendment principles. When informa-
tion, advice or facts are published with the intent that the
material contained in the publication will be relied upon by
readers, it is surprising that plaintiffs who are injured when
relying on these "how to" publications are denied recovery.
Nevertheless, the theory applied to these cases is caveat
emptor.
Although courts have rejected suggestions that publish-
ers warn unwitting consumers that they did not investigate
the text and cannot guarantee its accuracy, those courts
wrongly assume that requiring such a warning is tantamount
to imposing a duty to investigate. Since the publication of a
third-party author's work is a commercial endeavor, the dis-
closure that a publisher is neither author nor guarantor of
the publication promotes the free flow of commercial informa-
tion. Both individual consumers and society in general would
benefit from a disclosure that a publisher neither authors nor
guarantees its publication. Such disclosures may aid con-
sumers in deciding whether to purchase and rely upon a
"how to" publication.
Popular sentiment, as gleaned from news reports and the
political arena, seems unconcerned with First Amendment
principles as evidenced by a national clamoring to regulate
violence and sexually explicit material on television and
movie screens, in magazines and books, and in cyberspace.
Some argue, however, that it is not constituents, but politi-
cians clamoring for regulation. Nevertheless, the jurispru-
dence which develops in trying to control either physical or
dignitary harms, that are occasioned by or in reliance on the
publication of information, will be transformed as we enter
the twenty-first century and the information superhighway.
Although the cases discussed in this article demonstrate
that courts are reluctant to extend tort principles to publisher
liability cases, Congress may provide the "green light" for
courts to recognize publisher liability torts through regula-
tion of violence supplied by the media and entertainment in-
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dustry - an acknowledgment of the causation between me-
dia violence and subsequent violent behavior. 171 Aside from
the First Amendment issues raised by publisher liability
cases, congressional action affecting either increased tort lia-
bility or increased protection from tort liability through tort
reform raises federalism concerns.
This article raises more questions than it answers re-
garding the issue of publisher liability. However, the juris-
prudence in this area, although overwhelmingly protective of
publishers' First Amendment rights, should recognize that
tort liability and First Amendment protection can co-exist in
these cases, allowing redress to injured plaintiffs while pro-
viding publishers with First Amendment protections.
Through balancing the interest in protecting the challenged
speech against other state interests involved in recognizing
tort liability, the type of harm for which plaintiffs seek re-
dress in publisher liability cases can be compensated while
still protecting the values and principles embodied in the
First Amendment.
171. On the other hand, Congress is also considering major tort reform
which, if passed, would give greater protection to manufacturers and doctors in
product liability and medical malpractice actions. See A.B.A. J., August 1995,
at 56-75; Richard B. Schmitt, Groups Push for Action on Tort Reform, WALL
SmEET JouRNAL, August 7, 1995, at B5. It is uncertain how such proposed tort
reform would effect publisher liability tort actions. If the business and medical
communities are successful in lobbying Congress to pass such tort reforms, the
communication/media industry will likewise lobby Congress for national tort
reform if the industry is faced with increased publisher liability.
[Vol. 36106
